Globalization and Poverty by Jorge F. Balat & Guido G. Porto
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Globalization and Poverty
Volume Author/Editor: Ann Harrison, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-31794-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/harr06-1
Conference Date: September 10-12, 2004
Publication Date: March 2007
Title: Globalization and Complementary Policies: Poverty
Impacts on Rural Zambia
Author: Jorge F. Balat, Guido G. Porto
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0115373
9.1 Introduction
During the last decade, Zambia adopted several economic reforms, in-
cluding macroeconomic stabilization measures, trade liberalization, ex-
port promotion, and the elimination of marketing boards in maize and
cotton. These reforms were expected to be beneﬁcial in terms of national
welfare, diversity in consumption, and productivity growth. The eﬀects on
the distribution of income and poverty were more uncertain, and positive
impacts at the household level were harder to secure. In fact, poverty in
Zambia increased during the 1990s. In this paper, we have two main objec-
tives: to investigate the links between trade, complementary policies, and
poverty observed in Zambia during the last decade, and to explore how
new trade alternatives may bring about poverty alleviation in the future.
International trade introduces new opportunities and new hazards.
Households are aﬀected both as consumers and as producers or income
earners. As consumers, households are aﬀected when there are changes in
the prices of goods consumed by the family. As income earners, households
are aﬀected when there are responses in wages and in agricultural income.
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ral households.
We carry out a series of separate poverty exercises related to the con-
sumption and income impacts. On the income side, we are interested in ex-
ploring some of the dynamic eﬀects of international trade on rural areas
and agricultural activities. By facilitating access to larger international
markets and by boosting nontraditional export sectors, trade provides
incentives for rural households to move from subsistence to market-
oriented agriculture. To capture these eﬀects, we identify relevant agri-
cultural activities, by providing a detailed description of household
productive activities, and we estimate the income diﬀerential generated by
market agriculture over subsistence agriculture using matching methods.
These estimates provide a quantiﬁcation of the income gains that may
arise due to access to international markets and to the expansion of non-
traditional exports. In addition, these income diﬀerentials across traded
and nontraded agricultural activities may indicate the existence of distor-
tions and/or supply constraints that prevent farmers from taking full ad-
vantage of proﬁtable trading opportunities. Exploring these distortions
and constraints is important to fully understand the links between glob-
alization and poverty.
On the consumption side, we look at the eﬀects of the removal of maize
subsidies. There are two critical observations that support our somewhat
narrow focus. On the one hand, Zambian households devote a very large
fraction of total expenditure to food and, within food items, to maize; on
the other, one of the major agricultural reforms comprised the elimination
of the maize marketing board. In addition, we can use this experiment to
look at the role of complementary policies. Concretely, the increase in the
price of maize was expected to cause large welfare eﬀects. But it triggered
substitution eﬀects toward cheaper varieties of maize that were only pos-
sible when the government facilitated entry into the small-scale mill indus-
try. This is an instance in which complementary policies allowed house-
holds to smooth some of the welfare impacts of the increase in maize
prices. However, the government restricted maize imports by small mills,
or gave preference over publicly imported maize to industrial mills, and
this hurt consumers in times of production shortages.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 9.2, we describe the trends
in poverty observed in Zambia during the 1990s, we review the major re-
forms adopted during this period, and we characterize trends in traditional
(mining) and nontraditional (agriculture) exports. In section 9.3, we look
at sources of income, and we estimate income diﬀerential gains in market
agriculture. In section 9.4, we study the expenditure patterns of Zambian
households, and we explore the welfare costs of the elimination of con-
sumption subsidies on maize. Section 9.5 concludes.
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Zambia is a landlocked country located in southern central Africa.
Clockwise, its neighbors are the Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and Angola. In 2000, the total population
was 10.7 million inhabitants. With a per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) of only $302 in U.S. dollars, Zambia is one of the poorest countries
in the world and is considered a least developed country. The goal of this
section is to provide a brief characterization of trade and poverty in Zam-
bia.
9.2.1 Poverty
Zambia faces two poverty ordeals: it is one of the poorest countries in
the world, and it suﬀered from increasing poverty rates during the 1990s.
The analysis of the trends in poverty rates can be done using several house-
hold surveys. There are four of them in Zambia: two Priority Surveys, col-
lected in 1991 and 1993, and two Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys,
in 1996 and 1998. All the surveys were conducted by the Central Statistical
Oﬃce (CSO) using the sampling frame from the 1990 Census of Population
and Housing.
The Priority Survey of 1991 is a Social Dimension of Adjustment (SDA)
survey. It was conducted between October and November. The survey is
representative at the national level and covers all provinces and rural and
urban areas. A total of 9,886 households was interviewed. Questions on
household income, agricultural production, nonfarm activities, economic
activities, and expenditures were asked. Own-consumption values were im-
puted after the raw data were collected. Other questions referred to house-
hold assets, household characteristics (demographics), health, education,
economic activities, housing amenities, access to facilities (schools, hospi-
tals, markets), migration, remittances, and anthropometry.1
The 1996 and 1998 Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys expanded the
sample to around 11,750 and 16,800 households, respectively. The surveys
included all the questions covered in the Priority Survey of 1991 and ex-
panded the questionnaires to issues of home consumption and coping
strategies; they also gathered more comprehensive data on consumption
and income sources.
Table 9.1provides some information on poverty dynamics. In this paper,
we use the head count as our measure of poverty. The head count is the pro-
portion of the population with an income below the poverty line, which is
deﬁned as the monetary value of a basket of goods that would allow a per-
son to achieve a minimum caloric requirement (the food poverty line) and
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1. The 1993 Priority Survey was conducted during a diﬀerent agricultural season and is
therefore not comparable.a minimum nonfood expenditure (like housing or clothing).2 In 1991, the
poverty rate at the national level was 69.6 percent. Poverty increased in
1996, when the head count reached 80 percent, and then declined toward
1998, with a head count of 71.5 percent. In rural areas, poverty is wide-
spread; in these areas the head count was 88.3 percent in 1991, 90.5 per-
cent in 1996, and 82.1 percent in 1998. Urban areas fared better, with a
poverty rate of 47.2 percent in 1991, 62.1 percent in 1996, and 53.4 percent
in 1998 (ﬁg. 9.1).
In table 9.2, a more comprehensive description of the poverty proﬁle, by
provinces, is provided for 1998. Zambia is a geographically large country,
and provinces diﬀer in the quality of land, weather, access to water, and
access to infrastructure. The capital (Lusaka) and the Copperbelt area
absorbed most of the economic activity, particularly when mining and
copper powered the growth of the economy. The Central and Eastern
provinces are cotton production areas. The Southern Province houses the
Victoria Falls and beneﬁts from tourism. The remaining provinces are less
developed.
There were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the poverty rates across regions. All
provinces showed aggregate poverty counts higher than 60 percent, except
for Lusaka, the capital (48.4 percent). Poverty in Copperbelt was 63.2 per-
cent, and in the Southern Province, 68.2 percent. The highest head count
was observed in the Western Province, where 88.1 percent of the total pop-
ulation lived in poverty. The other provinces showed head counts in the
range of 70 to 80 percent. Poverty was much higher in rural areas than in
urban areas. Even in Lusaka, a mostly urban location, rural poverty
reached over 75 percent. In the Western Province, 90.3 percent of the rural
population lived in poverty in 1998. Urban poverty was lower, never ex-
ceeding 70 percent of the population (including the Western Province).
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Table 9.1 Poverty in Zambia (head count)
1991 1996 1998
National 69.6 80.0 71.5
Rural 88.3 90.5 82.1
Urban 47.2 62.1 53.4
Source: Own calculations based on the 1991 Priority Survey and the 1996 and 1998 Living
Conditions Monitoring surveys.
Note: The head count is the percentage of the population below the poverty line.
2. The food poverty line is computed with data on the caloric requirement of the diet of
diﬀerent individuals (males, females, adults, and children), on the caloric content of diﬀerent
food items (maize, milk, cassava), and on the prices of these goods. An allowance for other
expenses like housing, education, clothing, and so on is added to this amount to estimate the
poverty line. This is usually done by looking at the expenditure patterns of households in the
neighborhood of the food poverty line.Globalization and Complementary Policies 377
Fig. 9.1 Typical dwelling in rural Zambia
Table 9.2 Poverty proﬁle in 1998 (head count)
Total Rural Urban
National 71.5 82.1 53.4
Central 74.9 82.3 60.5
Copperbelt 63.2 82.1 57.5
Eastern 79.1 80.6 64.4
Luapula 80.1 84.6 52.4
Lusaka 48.4 75.7 42.4
Northern 80.6 83.3 66.4
North-Western 74.3 77.4 54.1
Southern 68.2 73.0 51.8
Western 88.1 90.3 69.5
Source: Own calculations based on the 1998 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey.
Note: The head count is the percentage of the population below the poverty line.
9.2.2 Major Reforms
The Republic of Zambia achieved independence in 1964. A key charac-
teristic of the country is its abundance of natural resources, particularly
mineral deposits (like copper) and land. Due to high copper prices, the new
republic did quite well in the initial stages of development. Poverty and in-
equality, however, were widespread, and this raised concerns among thepeople and the policymakers. Soon the government began to adopt inter-
ventionist policies, with a much larger participation of the state in national
development. Interventions included import substitution, price controls of
all major agricultural products (like maize), and nationalization of manu-
facturing, agricultural marketing, and mining.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the decline in copper prices and the negative ex-
ternal conditions led to stagnation and high levels of external debt. A cri-
sis emerged, and a structural adjustment program was implemented be-
tween 1983 and 1985. Riots in 1986 forced the government to abandon the
reforms in 1987. A second International Monetary Fund (IMF) program
failed in 1989, when the removal of controls in maize led to signiﬁcant price
increases.
In 1991, a new government was elected. Faced with a sustained, severe
recession and with a meager future, the new government began economy-
wide reforms including macroeconomic stabilization, exchange rate lib-
eralization, ﬁscal restructuring, removal of maize subsidies, decontrol of
agricultural prices, privatization of agricultural marketing, and trade and
industrial policy. Table 9.3, reproduced from McCulloch, Baulch, and
Cherel-Robson (2001), describes the major reforms adopted during the
1990s.
A major component of the reforms of the 1990s was the elimination of
the marketing boards in maize and cotton. Before 1994, intervention in
cotton markets was widespread. It involved setting prices for sales of certi-
ﬁed cotton seeds, pesticides, and sprayers; providing subsidized inputs to
producers; facilitating access to credit; and so on.3 From 1977 to 1994, the
Lint Company of Zambia (Lintco) acted as a nexus between local Zambian
producers and international markets. Lintco had a monopsony in seed cot-
ton markets and a monopoly in inputs sales and credit loans to farmers.
These interventions were eliminated in 1994, when markets were liberal-
ized. Soon after liberalization, Lintco was sold to Lonrho Cotton, and a
domestic monopsony was formed. Subsequent entry led to geographical
monopsonies rather than national oligopsonies since ﬁrms segmented the
market geographically. By 1997, the expansion of the cotton production
base attracted new entrants. Competition ensued, supplanting the local-
ized monopsonies.
At present, most cotton production in Zambia is carried out under out-
grower schemes. There are two systems utilized by diﬀerent ﬁrms: the
farmer group system and the farmer distributor system. In the latter, ﬁrms
designate one individual or farmer as the distributor and provide inputs.
The distributor prepares individual contracts with the farmers. He is also
in charge of assessing reasons for loan defaults, being able, in principle, to
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3. For more details on cotton reforms in Zambia, see Food Security Research Project (2000)







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9condone default in special cases. He is in charge of renegotiating contracts
in incoming seasons. In the farmer group system, small-scale producers
deal with the ginneries directly, purchasing inputs on loan and repaying at
the time of harvest. Both systems seem to work well.
Fueled by high copper prices and exports, during the 1970s and 1980s
Zambia maintained large systems of maize production and consumption
subsidies. They were administered by marketing boards. External shocks
(the collapse of copper prices) and inappropriate domestic policies made
marketing boards unsustainable and led to their elimination in the reforms
of the 1990s. The removal of the distortions was supposed to bring about
aggregate welfare gains. In practice, the eﬀects on household welfare criti-
cally depended on complementary policies like the provision of infrastruc-
ture and the introduction of competition policies.4
In 1993, the government began reforming the maize pricing and mar-
keting system, eliminating subsidies, and removing international trade re-
strictions. The most important reforms consisted of the removal of all price
controls (including panterritorial and panseasonal pricing) and the decen-
tralization of maize marketing and processing. At present, the marketing
board has been fully eliminated. However, as of 2001, the government im-
plemented a ﬂoor price for production of maize.
9.2.3 Trade Trends
Zambia’s major trading partners are the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA), particularly Zimbabwe, Malawi and the
Congo, South Africa, the European Union (EU) and Japan. The main im-
ports comprise petroleum, which accounted for 13.2 percent of total im-
ports in 1999; metals (iron, steel), for 16.9 percent; and fertilizers, for 13
percent. Other important import lines include chemicals, machinery, and
manufactures.
Zambian exports have been dominated by copper. In fact, since inde-
pendence and up to 1990, exports consisted almost entirely of copper,
which accounted for more than 90 percent of total export earnings. Only
recently has diversiﬁcation into nontraditional exports become important.
The details are in table 9.4, which reports the evolution and composition of
exports from 1990 to 1999. In 1990, metal exports accounted for 93 percent
of total commodity exports. Nontraditional exports, such as primary
products, agroprocessing, and textiles, accounted for the remaining 7 per-
cent. From 1990 to 1999, the decline in metal exports and the increase in
nontraditional exports are evident. In 1999, for example, 61 percent of to-
tal exports comprised metal products, while 39 percent were nontradi-
tional exports. Within nontraditional exports, the main components are
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4. For a description of the early reforms in maize marketing and pricing, see World Bank
(1994).primary products, ﬂoricultural products, textiles, processed foods, horti-
culture, textiles, and animal products.
The last column of table 9.4 reports some informal export growth pro-
jections for some of the nontraditional categories. Notice that agriculture
is expected to grow at a high rate over the decade, contributing to nearly
20 percent of total exports, up from less than 2 percent in 1990. For
COMESA and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC),
cotton, tobacco, meat, poultry, dairy products, soybeans, sunﬂower, sor-
ghum, groundnuts, paprika, maize, and cassava are promising markets.
For markets in developed countries (the EU, the United States), coﬀee,
paprika, sugar, cotton, tobacco, ﬂoriculture, horticulture, vegetables,
groundnuts, and honey comprise the best prospects for export growth.
Exports are largely liberalized. There are no oﬃcial export taxes,
charges, or levies. Further, export controls and regulations are minimal.
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Table 9.4 Exports, 1990–99 (millions of U.S. dollars)
Annual growth rate (%)
Actual Projected 
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1990–99 1999–2010
Metal exports 1,168 1,039 754 809 630 468
Nontraditional exports 89 178 226 315 308 298
Primary agriculture 15 24 38 91 62 73 22 13
Floricultural products 1 14 18 21 33 43 52 13
Textiles 9 39 40 51 42 37 17 13
Processed and reﬁned 
f o o d s 6 2 53 4 3 14 9 3 3 2 4 1 7
Horticultural products 5 4 9 16 21 24 19 13
Engineering products 20 39 37 42 32 23 2 8
Semiprecious stones 8 8 11 15 12 14 21 13
Building materials 4 5 8 12 9 10 11 8
Other manufactures 0 1 1 3 3 7 11
Petroleum oils 11 11 6 2 7 6 –7 7
Chemical products 3 2 3 8 7 6 8 –4
Animal products 2 1 2 3 4 4 8 16
Wood products 1 1 2 3 3 3 13 8
Leather products 1 2 2 2 3 2 8 16
Nonmetallic minerals 2 1 1 1 1 1 13
Garments 3 0 0 0 0 0 –20 23
Handicrafts 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 11
Reexports 0 4 4 4 3
Scrap metal 0 11 6 4 6 0
Mining 0 4 12 3
Total commodity exports 1,257 1,217 981 1,123 937 766 –5 11
Metal share of total (%) 93 85 77 72 67 61
Source: Bank of Zambia and IMF.Maize exports, however, are sometimes subject to bans for national food
security reasons. In 2002, for instance, the export ban on maize was in
place. There are some export incentives, from tax exemptions to conces-
sions to duty drawback. For example, an income tax of 15 percent (instead
of the standard 35 percent rate) is granted to exporters of nontraditional
goods who hold an investment license. Also, investments in tourism are
sometimes exempted from duties.
9.3 Income
We are most interested in exploring the eﬀects of trade on the income of
Zambian households. By aﬀecting wages and cash agricultural income,
trade opportunities are likely to have large impacts on household resources
and on poverty. As argued by Deaton (1997) and others, the short-run
eﬀects of price changes can be assessed by looking at income shares. In
table 9.5, we report the average income shares for diﬀerent sources of in-
come. At the national level, the main sources of income are income from
home consumption (28.3 percent), income from nonfarm businesses (22.3
percent), and wages (20.8 percent). Regarding agricultural income, the sale
of food crops accounts for 6.3 percent of total income, while the sale of
cash crops accounts for only 2.5 percent. Livestock and poultry and re-
mittances account for 5.5 and 4.9 percent of household income, respec-
tively.
There are important diﬀerences in income sources between poor and
nonpoor households. While the share of own-production is 33.3 percent in
the average poor household, it is 19.1 percent in nonpoor families. In con-
382 Jorge F. Balat and Guido G. Porto
Table 9.5 Sources of income (%)
National Rural Urban
Total Poor Nonpoor Total Poor Nonpoor Total Poor Nonpoor
Own production 28.3 33.3 19.1 42.5 42.9 42.0 3.3 4.4 2.4
Sales of food crops 6.3 7.6 3.8 9.1 9.5 7.6 1.4 1.7 1.1
Sales of nonfood 
crops 2.5 3.0 1.3 3.8 4.0 2.9 0.1 0.1 0.1
Livestock and 
poultry 5.5 6.8 2.9 8.1 8.7 5.9 0.8 1.0 0.7
Wages 20.8 14.4 32.9 6.9 5.9 10.3 45.3 40.3 49.4
Income, nonfarm 22.3 20.9 24.9 16.8 16.3 18.3 32.0 34.7 29.7
Remittances 4.9 5.0 4.8 5.3 5.0 6.1 4.3 4.9 3.9
Other sources 9.5 9.0 10.3 7.5 7.7 6.9 12.8 13.0 12.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Own calculations based on the 1998 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey.
Note: The table reports income shares.trast, while wages account for 32.9 percent of the total income of the non-
poor, they account for only 14.1 percent of the income of the poor. The
shares of the income generated in nonfarm businesses are 20.8 and 25 per-
cent in poor and nonpoor households, respectively. The poor earn a larger
share of income from the sales of both food and cash crops, and lower
shares from livestock and poultry.
It is interesting to compare the diﬀerent sources of income across rural
and urban areas. In rural areas, for instance, 42.5 percent of total income
is accounted for by own production; the share in urban areas is only 3.3
percent. The share of nonfarm income in rural areas is 16.7 percent, which
should be compared with a 32.1 percent in urban areas. In rural areas, the
shares from food crops, livestock, wages, and cash crops are 9.1, 8.1, 6.9,
and 3.8, respectively. In urban areas, in contrast, wages account for 45.3
percent of household income, and the contribution of agricultural activi-
ties is much smaller.
The description of income shares is also useful because it highlights the
main channels through which trade opportunities can have an impact on
household income. We can conclude that, in rural areas, households derive
most of their income from subsistence agricultural and nontradable ser-
vices (nonfarm income). Cash crop activities and agricultural wages com-
prise a smaller fraction of total household income. In our analysis of the
diﬀerential impacts of trade on household income, we focus on these last
farm activities, for they are more likely to be directly aﬀected by interna-
tional markets.5
We explore the poverty alleviation eﬀects of growth in nontraditional ex-
ports. If trade leads to higher prices for agricultural goods or higher wages,
then there is a ﬁrst-order impact on income given by the income shares de-
scribed in table 9.5. But changes in the extensive margin should be ex-
pected, too. In rural areas, this involves farmers switching from subsistence
to market-oriented agriculture. For instance, small-scale producers of own
food are expected to beneﬁt from access to markets by producing higher-
return cash crops, such as cotton, tobacco, groundnuts, or nontraditional
exports such as vegetables.
It is this attempt to identify and estimate second-round eﬀects of in-
creased market opportunities in rural areas that distinguishes this paper
from most of the current literature. Starting with the pioneering work of
Deaton (1989, 1997), estimation of ﬁrst-order eﬀects in consumption and
income has become widespread. Techniques to estimate substitution in
consumption are also available (Deaton 1990). But estimation of supply re-
sponses has proved much more diﬃcult. The survey in Winters, McCul-
Globalization and Complementary Policies 383
5. Notice that there may be spillover eﬀects if trade causes growth in income and this leads
to higher expenditures on nontradable good and services. We are unable to capture these
eﬀects in the data.loch, and McKay (2004) highlights these issues and reports some of the
available methods and results. In this paper, we capture supply responses
using matching methods: by matching households in subsistence agricul-
ture with households in market agriculture, we are able to estimate the av-
erage income diﬀerential generated by market-oriented activities. We do
this for diﬀerent crops as follows.
In rural areas, there are two main channels through which new trade op-
portunities can aﬀect household income.6 On the one hand, households
produce agricultural goods that are sold to agroprocessing ﬁrms. This in-
volves what we call cash crop activities. On the other hand, household
members may earn a wage in a large-scale agricultural farm. This means
that workers, instead of working in home plots for home production or
cash crops, earn a wage in rural (local) labor markets. In this paper, we fo-
cus on these two types of activities.
We begin by identifying meaningful agricultural activities for the
poverty analysis. Due to regional variation in soil, climate, and infrastruc-
ture, the relevant sources of income may be diﬀerent for households resid-
ing in diﬀerent provinces. To see this, we report in table 9.6 the main
sources of household income in the rural areas of the nine Zambian
provinces. For each agricultural product, the table shows the average share
of total income accounted for by a given activity, the mean household in-
come conditional on having positive income in a given activity, and the
sample size, the number of households that are active in that particular
agricultural activity.
Looking at income shares ﬁrst, we observe that in the Central, Eastern,
and Southern provinces, the most relevant cash crop is cotton. Poultry and
livestock are also important sources of income, particularly in the South-
ern Province. Tobacco is a promising crop in the Eastern Province, and hy-
brid maize in the Central Province. In the Copperbelt Province, the most
relevant products are vegetables and hybrid maize; in Luapula, they are
groundnuts and cassava; in the Northern Province, cassava and beans; and
in the North-Western Province, cassava. In all the provinces, livestock and
poultry are two good sources of agricultural income.
A key aspect of international trade is that it opens up markets for new
products. This implies that some relatively minor sources of income may
become quantitatively more important as nontraditional exports grow.
Notice, however, that in order to extract meaningful information from the
Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, we face the practical constraint of
sample sizes in our analysis. The data on the number of households re-
porting positive income and the average value of income for diﬀerent agri-
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6. See Porto (2005) for a descriptive household production model with these features. This
model builds on previous work by Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), Barnum and Squire









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.cultural products reported in table 9.6 give a sense of the potential rele-
vance of those products. Based on this information, we identify the follow-
ing meaningful agricultural products: cotton, vegetables (including beans),
tobacco (in the Eastern Province only), groundnuts, hybrid maize, cassava,
sunﬂowers, livestock, and poultry.
We turn now to a description of the methods that we use. Our aim is to
estimate the diﬀerential income generated by market agricultural activities
vis-à-vis subsistence agriculture, and to explore the poverty alleviation
eﬀects of allowing for an expansion of cash market activities among Zam-
bian farmers. We use matching methods based on the propensity score.
There is a large literature on matching methods. Original pieces include
Rubin (1977) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). More recently, Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) and Heckman et al. (1996) extended and
assessed these methods. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) provided a practical
examination of propensity score-matching methods using the data in La-
londe (1986).
We perform separate matching exercises, one for each of the cash agri-
cultural products previously identiﬁed in table 9.6 (i.e., cotton, tobacco,
hybrid maize, groundnuts, vegetables, cassava, sunﬂowers, and rural labor
markets).7 We estimate a probit model of participation into market agri-
cultural, which deﬁnes the propensity score p(X), for a given vector of ob-
servables X. Subsistence farmers are matched with market farmers based
on this propensity score, and the income diﬀerential is estimated using ker-
nel methods. Details follow.
Let yh
m be the income per hectare in market agriculture (e.g., cotton) of
household h. Let ys
h be the home-produced own consumption per hectare.
Deﬁne an indicator variable M, where M 1 if the household derives most
of its income from cash agriculture. In practice, most Zambian households
in rural areas produce something for own consumption. As a consequence,
we assign M   1 to households that derive more than 50 percent of their
income from a given cash agricultural activity. Households that derive
most of their income from home production are assigned M   0. The
propensity score p(X) is deﬁned as the conditional probability of partici-
pating in market agriculture
p(X)   P(M  1⏐X).
We are interested in estimating the average income diﬀerential of those in-
volved in cash market agriculture. This can be deﬁned as
  E[yh
m   ys
h⏐M   1].
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7. We do not consider the case of livestock and poultry because, ﬁrst, it seems reasonable
to assume that this activity requires larger initial investments and, second, because Zambia
has not dealt with the problem of animal disease yet.The main assumption of matching methods is that the participation into
market agriculture can be based on observables. This is the ignorability of
treatment assignment. More formally, we require that yh
m, ys
h ⊥ M⏐X.
When the propensity score is balanced, we know that M ⊥ X⏐p(X). This
means that, conditional on p(X), the participation in market agriculture M
and the observables X are independent. In other words, observations with
a given propensity score have the same distribution of observables X for
households involved in market agriculture as in subsistence. The impor-




This means that, conditionally on p(X), the returns in market agriculture
and in subsistence are independent of market participation, which implies
that households in subsistence and in cash agriculture are comparable.
In general, the assumption that participation depends on observables
can be quite strong. In Zambia, the decision to be involved in market agri-
culture seems to depend on three main variables: access to markets, food
security, and tradition in subsistence agriculture. Farmers need market ac-
cess to sell their agricultural products. In Zambia, many farmers reveal
strong preferences to secure food needs before engaging in market agricul-
ture. This behavior is probably aﬀected by issues of risk aversion and lack
of insurance. Tradition in agriculture may be the consequence of risk aver-
sion, but it may be related to know-how and social capital in food agricul-
ture. We capture these eﬀects by including in the propensity function sev-
eral key control variables like regional (district) dummies, the size of the
household, the demographic structure of the family, the age and the edu-
cation of the household head, and the availability of agricultural tools. We
believe these variables X comprise a comprehensive set of observables to
explain the selection mechanism.
It is possible to argue that there are still important unobservables that
can generate biases in the results. An example would be, for instance, rain-
fall or temperature, which we could capture with the district dummies. Soil
quality diﬀerences are important. We control for this by doing separate
matching exercises in diﬀerent agroclimatic regions. This means, for in-
stance, that cotton farmers will be compared only with farmers producing
food crops in cotton-growing areas. We do the same for tobacco and other
products. But there will be other unobservables that we are unable to con-
trol for (like, for instance, unobserved farming activities). This is true, of
course, for all matching exercises. Nevertheless, we believe that we have a
reasonable model of the selection process, one that will allow us to extract
useful estimates of the income gains in cash market agriculture. Table 9.7
reports the results of the estimation of the probit model for the most im-
portant cash agriculture crops.
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Cotton Tobacco Groundnuts Vegetables Maize Wages
Constant –1.338 –4.233 –2.210 –0.331 –0.777 2.264
(0.796) (1.821) (0.709) (0.734) (0.988) (0.919)
Married –0.135 0.892 0.289 –0.466 –0.250 0.470
(0.254) (0.614) (0.187) (0.200) (0.177) (0.154)
Male 0.357 0.506 –0.364 0.365 0.275 –1.241
(0.242) (0.485) (0.188) (0.223) (0.193) (0.152)
Age 0.009 0.094 –0.016 –0.031 0.005 –0.100
(0.027) (0.070) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.049)
Age squared 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Primary 0.448 –0.012 0.055 0.158 0.164 0.054
(0.154) (0.306) (0.122) (0.150) (0.114) (0.160)
High school (jr.) 0.390 0.134 0.295 0.427 0.277 0.375
(0.203) (0.676) (0.149) (0.168) (0.133) (0.170)
High school (sr.) 0.255 –0.591 –0.418 0.523 0.405 0.964
(0.361) (0.877) (0.387) (0.279) (0.226) (0.254)
Higher education 0.774 0.000 –0.318 1.006 1.450 1.127
(0.889) (0.000) (0.687) (0.431) (0.449) (0.407)
HH males –0.183 0.884 0.309 –0.005 –0.058 0.966
(0.342) (0.769) (0.246) (0.293) (0.237) (0.323)
HH age 8–12 –0.151 –0.495 0.469 –0.462 0.692 0.626
(0.529) (1.248) (0.419) (0.515) (0.401) (0.498)
HH age 13–18 –0.121 0.070 0.082 –0.047 0.156 0.668
(0.461) (0.960) (0.347) (0.399) (0.347) (0.446)
HH age 19–45 0.092 –1.594 0.351 –0.550 0.399 1.259
(0.399) (1.011) (0.322) (0.398) (0.304) (0.368)
HH age 46  –0.025 –0.425 0.532 –0.449 –0.044 2.610
(0.466) (1.025) (0.336) (0.434) (0.362) (0.544)
HH ill –0.814 0.271 –0.526 –0.075 0.060 –0.402
(0.340) (0.552) (0.236) (0.293) (0.238) (0.302)
Distance food market 0.007 0.013 –0.003 –0.003 0.004 –0.014
(0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Distance mill 0.012 0.000 –0.007 0.000 –0.038
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.015)
Distance inputs –0.003 0.005 –0.001 0.000 –0.005 0.000
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Distance water 0.096 –0.104 –0.168 –0.149
(0.261) (0.088) (0.113) (0.082)
Tools 0.603 –0.618 –0.069 0.375 0.411
(0.147) (0.441) (0.177) (0.169) (0.124)
Owner –0.121 –1.142 0.056 –0.104 –0.418 –1.555
(0.400) (0.586) (0.292) (0.273) (0.226) (0.177)
Land 0.030 0.362 0.077 0.014 0.142 0.058
(0.024) (0.094) (0.024) (0.026) (0.016) (0.018)
No. of observations 914 294 2,138 1,746 2,053 2,280
Treated 141 37 159 118 265 139
Nontreated 773 257 1,979 1,628 1,788 2,141
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.31 0.17 0.26 0.34 0.50
Notes: Table shows probit estimates of the probability of producing cash crops. Regressions also include dis-
trict dummies not shown in the table. Standard errors in parentheses. Married, male, age, age squared, and ed-
ucation dummies (primary, high school junior, high school senior, and higher education) refer to household
head. HH males is the share of males in the household. HH age 8–12, HH age 13–18, HH age 19–45, and HH
age 46  are the shares of household members between ages 8 and 12, 13 and 18, 19 and 45, and over 46, re-
spectively. HH ill is the share of ill members in the households. Distance food market, Distance mill, Distance
inputs, and Distance water are distances (in kilometers) to the nearest food market, mill, crop inputs market,
and water, respectively. Owner is a dummy that equals 1 if the household owns its farm.In all our exercises, the balancing condition is tested following the pro-
cedure suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (2002). In all the cases, except for
paprika and sunﬂowers, the balancing property is satisﬁed. This is a minor
requirement that we impose in our procedure (we cannot test the ignora-
bility requirement). In addition, as suggested by Dehejia and Wahba
(2002) and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998), we graph his-
tograms of the propensity score for those in market and those in subsis-
tence. For the case of cotton, for example, such a plot is reported in ﬁgure
9.2. These graphs are important because they reveal the usefulness of the
estimated propensity score as a predictor of the selection process. Since we
are matching farmers on the basis of these propensity scores, we would like
to ﬁnd that the predicted probability for those farmers in subsistence is
similar to the predicted probabilities for those farmers actually doing cash
agriculture. In other words, this graph shows the number of subsistence
farmers that can be meaningfully matched with cotton farmers. In ﬁgure
9.2, for instance, we ﬁnd suﬃcient overlaps in the propensity scores.8 This
means that, at least in the region of common support of the propensity
score, there are enough comparison units to match each cotton producer.9
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Fig. 9.2 Propensity score in cotton
Note:The graph shows the proportion of market agriculture households and subsistence agri-
culture households for diﬀerent values of the propensity score.
8. Similar results are found in most of the other agricultural activities considered in this
paper.
9. It is recommended that farmers in the region of noncommon support be excluded from
the sample. We followed this suggestion in the estimation of the average eﬀects.There are two models that we want to explore, the constrained house-
hold model and the unconstrained household model. In the latter, house-
holds are assumed not to face signiﬁcant constraints in terms of land, fam-
ily labor supply, or inputs. This means that it would be possible for the
household to plant an additional hectare of, say, cotton or cassava. In this
case, the relevant quantity to estimate is the income that could be earned in
cash activities. No income would be forgone by expanding cash crop activ-
ities. In contrast, in the constrained household model, land or labor im-
poses a limitation to farming activities. If a family were to plant an addi-
tional acre of cotton, then an acre of land devoted to own consumption
(and other relevant resources) should be released.
It is unclear which model better explains the situation in Zambia. In
some regions, land availability seems not to be a real constraint and farm-
ers could in principle use additional hectares at no cost. In some places, la-
bor supply and labor discipline seem to be a more important limitation.
Access to seeds and inputs is relatively widespread in the case of cotton due
to the outgrower scheme (see section 9.2). Other crops, such as hybrid
maize, may require purchases of seeds in advance, something that may be
diﬃcult for many farmers. Fertilizers may also be expensive, but govern-
mental subsidy programs in place may help ease the constraints. In any
case, it is our belief that important lessons can be learned from the com-
parison of the results in the two models. The constrained model would give
a sense of the short-run beneﬁts of moving away from subsistence to mar-
ket agriculture. The unconstrained model would reveal the additional ben-
eﬁts to Zambian farmers of helping release major agricultural constraints.
Results are reported in table 9.8. The ﬁrst two columns correspond to the
gains per hectare in the constrained model. In the next two columns, the
constrained household is assumed to expand cash agricultural activities by
the average size of the plots devoted to each of these activities. The follow-
ing two columns report the gains per hectare in the unconstrained model;
this model is directly comparable to that in the ﬁrst two columns. The last
two columns report the gains in the unconstrained model in the hypothet-
ical situation in which the farmer moves from subsistence to market but de-
votes the average area to the market crop.
We begin by describing the case of cotton, the major market crop in
some provinces (ﬁg. 9.3). In the constrained model, farmers growing cot-
ton are expected to gain 18,232 kwachas (Kw), on average, more than sim-
ilar farmers engaged in subsistence agriculture. The gain is equivalent to
19.9 percent of the average expenditure of a representative poor farmer. To
get a better sense of what these numbers mean, notice that the food poverty
line in 1998 was estimated at Kw32,233 per month and the poverty line at
Kw46,287 per month (per adult equivalent). Further, since the exchange
rate in December 1998 was around Kw2,200, the gains are equivalent to
just over US$8 (at 1998 prices).



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.So far, we have assumed that farmers give up one hectare of own con-
sumption to produce an additional hectare of cotton. But the actual gains
will depend on the area of cotton planted. One alternative exercise is to al-
low farmers to plant the average size of a typical cotton plot, which is esti-
mated at 1.2 hectares. In this case, the constrained model generates a gain
of Kw21,878. This is equivalent to 23.9 percent of the income of the poor.
This model is perhaps more meaningful than the one-hectare exercise. It is
important to notice that the average size of the land plots allocated to
home production ranges from 1.5 to 5 hectares, with an unconditional av-
erage of around 2 hectares. This means that, on average, households would
be able to substitute away from own-consumption activities and toward
cotton-growing activities.
Our ﬁndings highlight important gains from switching to cotton. How-
ever, the magnitudes do not look too high, particularly given the relevance
of cotton as an export commodity. One explanation for this result is that
we have been working with the constrained model, according to which
a farmer must forgo income to earn cotton income. If some of these con-
straints were eliminated, so that households could earn extra income from
cotton without giving up subsistence income, gains would be much higher.
We estimate these gains with the mean cotton income, conditional on pos-
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Fig. 9.3 Cotton farm in eastern Zambiaitive income and on being matched with a subsistence farmer.10 The ex-
pected gain from planting an additional hectare of cotton would be
Kw51,516 (or approximately Kw10,273 per equivalent adult). These are
larger gains, equivalent to around 56.4 percent of the average expenditure
of poor households in rural areas. If the farmer were to grow the average
size of cotton crops in Zambia (i.e., 1.2 hectares), then the gains in the un-
constrained model would be Kw61,883, which is roughly equal to 67.7 per-
cent of the average expenditure of the poor.
Another commercial crop with great potential in international markets
is tobacco. In the constrained model, the gain per hectare of switching
from subsistence agriculture to tobacco would be Kw80,661 monthly, or
roughly 88.2 percent of average total household expenditure. Since, on av-
erage, 0.8 hectares are allocated to tobacco, the household would gain
Kw64,529 if this plot size were planted. In the unconstrained model, the
gain would be Kw119,124, around 130 percent of the total expenditure of
an average poor household. If the average of 0.8 hectares were planted
(without any constraints), the income gains would reach Kw95,299, ap-
proximately doubling expenditure. Growing tobacco seems to be an im-
portant vehicle for poverty alleviation.
Results for vegetables and groundnuts, two crops often mentioned as
good prospects for nontraditional exports, reveal that no statistically sig-
niﬁcant gains can be expected in the constrained model. In the data, there
is evidence of higher earnings in planting vegetables and lower earnings in
planting groundnuts, but neither is statistically signiﬁcant. Instead, gains
can be realized if the constraints are released. For vegetables, the gain per
hectare would be Kw89,451, or Kw33,991 if the average plot size devoted
to this crop is planted. This is 37.2 percent of total average household ex-
penditure. In the case of groundnuts, these gains would be equivalent to
only 20 percent of the expenditure of households in poverty.
One key crop in Zambia is maize, which is grown by the vast majority of
households. Farmers grow local varieties and hybrid maize. The former is
mainly devoted to own consumption and is not considered suitable for
world markets. Hybrid maize is, instead, potentially exportable. In table
9.8, we ﬁnd that a farmer who switches from purely subsistence activities
to produce (and sell) hybrid maize would make an additional Kw50,933.
This gain, which is statistically signiﬁcant, is equivalent to 55.7 percent of
the expenditure of the poor. This is the expected gain, on average, since the
average plot allocated to hybrid maize is estimated at precisely one hectare.
If we assume that an additional hectare of maize is planted in a model with-
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10. This matching implies two things. First, it means that the balancing property between
cotton growers and subsistence farmers is satisﬁed. Second, it means that if a cotton farmer
is too diﬀerent from subsistence farmers, so that a match does not exist, then the income of
this farmer is not used in the estimation of the average gain.out household constraints, the income diﬀerential would be Kw100,800, or
around the average expenditure of poor households.
These are important results. To begin with, we ﬁnd support for the ar-
gument that claims that income gains can be achieved through the produc-
tion and sale of hybrid maize. In addition, since most Zambian farmers
across the whole country grow (or grew) maize, there is a presumption that
they are able to produce it eﬃciently and that some of the constraints faced
in other crops—such as know-how, fertilizer use, and seed usage—may not
be present. In those regions in which cotton and tobacco, major exportable
crops, are not suitable agricultural products (due to weather or soil condi-
tions), the production of hybrid maize appears as a valid alternative.
Other crops identiﬁed as potentially exportable are cassava and sun-
ﬂowers. These turn out to be irrelevant cases. The data were not good
enough to allow for a meaningful evaluation of the beneﬁts from exports.
Either sample sizes were too small or the balancing conditions required to
apply matching methods were not satisﬁed. This does not mean that there
will be no gains from developing these markets but rather that the data are
not suitable for our analysis. Finally, we have decided not to pursue the in-
vestigation of the cases of livestock and poultry, mainly because they in-
volve signiﬁcant initial investments. In addition, disease control is critical
in these activities, and it is unclear whether Zambia will manage to achieve
the standards needed to compete in international markets.
There is an additional exercise that we perform. If larger market access
is achieved, rural labor markets may expand and workers may become em-
ployed and earn a wage. We can learn about the magnitudes of the income
gains of moving from home plot agriculture to rural wage employment in
agriculture by comparing the average income obtained in these activities.
Concretely, we compare the average monthly wages of those workers em-
ployed in rural labor markets with the own consumption per working
household member in subsistence agriculture.11 In table 9.8, we estimate a
gain of Kw95,307 per month in the constrained model (so that individuals
would have to leave farming activities at home to work at a local large
farm). In the unconstrained model (i.e., a model in which the worker be-
comes employed but keeps working in subsistence during the weekends),
the gains would be Kw117,305. These gains range from 104.2 percent to
128.3 percent of the total expenditure of the average poor household in ru-
ral areas.
As in the cases of cotton, tobacco, and maize, the magnitudes of these
gains suggest that rural employment in commercial farms could be a good
instrument for poverty alleviation. There is evidence that, by fostering the
development of larger-scale agricultural activities, international trade op-
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11. This is computed as the ratio of reported own consumption and the total number of
household members who work in subsistence agriculture.portunities can help rural farmers to move out of poverty through rural la-
bor markets, employment, and wage income.
It is important to show some evidence that the kind of switching that we
are describing can actually take place. A careful answer to this question re-
quires a panel data set that would allow us to track farmers who switched
from subsistence to market agriculture, and compare their welfare before
and after the switch. Unfortunately, this type of data is not available in
Zambia. However, an overview of farm dynamics can be provided by com-
paring the evolution of the shares of income derived from cash agriculture
at diﬀerent time periods. Concretely, we estimate the average share of in-
come generated by market agriculture in 1996 and 1998 at diﬀerent points
of the income distribution. We use nonparametric regressions (Fan 1992;
Pagan and Ullah 1999). Figure 9.4 displays the results: the solid line repre-
sents the average shares in 1998, while the broken line corresponds to the
averages in 1996. The graph reveals a clear switch toward market agricul-
ture during the 1996–98 period. Among the poorest farmers, for instance,
the share of income derived from cash agriculture increased from around 2
to 8 percent to over 20 percent. From the middle to the top of the income
distribution, the increase in shares is of roughly 10 percentage points.
This analysis clearly indicates that the increase in market agriculture is
correlated with the observed increase in exports of nontraditional agricul-
tural products. This implies that the expansion of these activities is not due
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Fig. 9.4 Income shares derived from cash agriculture 1991–98
Notes: The graph shows the average shares of income derived from cash market agriculture.
The solid and dotted lines represent the shares estimated with 1998 and 1996 data, respec-
tively. The averages are estimated with nonparametric locally weighted regressions (Fan
1992).simply to a contraction of other traditional sectors such as copper. Also,
copper production is mainly an urban phenomenon aﬀecting more urban
employment than rural activities.12
Our interpretation of the results so far is as follows. We provided evi-
dence of an increase in nontraditional exports that is concurrent with an
increase in income shares coming from nontraditional agricultural goods.
This implies that, faced with new trade opportunities, some Zambian
farmers have switched from subsistence farming to cash market agricul-
ture. This switch is only partial, since many farmers continue to produce
some food for own consumption, but ﬁgure 9.4 reveals that switching is in-
deed a possibility. In addition, we showed that there are still income gains
that could potentially be realized from further switching to market agri-
culture. The combination of these farm dynamics with the evidence of in-
come gains estimated in table 9.8 suggests a natural role of trade and mar-
kets as vehicles for poverty alleviation.
The fact that there are income gains to be realized in market agriculture
means that there are severe distortions and constraints in rural Zambia.
We think of export opportunities as a way of releasing some of these con-
straints by providing markets for Zambian products. Access to interna-
tional markets seems to be a basic prerequisite for successful poverty alle-
viation. But this is not enough. The realization of the gains associated with
export opportunities will become feasible with complementary domestic
policies. These may include extension services to farmers (transmission of
information and know-how about producing a crop, crop diversiﬁcation,
and fertilizer and pesticide use), the provision of infrastructure and irriga-
tion, the development of stronger ﬁnancial and credit markets, and the
provision of education (both formal education and labor discipline) and
better health services.
It is easy to see why complementary policies matter. More educated
households will be more prepared to face international markets and to
adopt new crops and production techniques. If credit is made accessible to
rural farmers, a larger fraction of them will be able to cover any necessary
initial investment (in seeds, fertilizer, tools) needed to substitute subsis-
tence production for cotton production (for instance). If better infrastruc-
ture is provided, transaction and production costs will be lower, facilitat-
ing trade of cash crops. And if better marketing opportunities arise,
farmers will be “closer” to the market.
It is very hard, due to data limitation, to empirically investigate the role
of these complementary policies.13 In rural areas in Africa, though, many
of the relevant issues can be illustrated by extension services in agriculture.
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12. Notice, however, that there might be spillover eﬀects through migration or remittances.
13. The analysis that follows was motivated by a suggestion from M. Slaughter to include
a more detailed study of one policy.These are services provided by the government (and by some agricultural
intermediaries) that give farmers information and support on a variety of
topics. These include information about markets, prices, buyers, and sell-
ers; education on technology adoption, crop diversiﬁcation, and crop hus-
bandry; information on fertilizer use, seeds, and machinery; and many
other aspects of everyday topics that may take place in the process of agri-
cultural production. In consequence, we believe that a lot can be learned
about the role of complementary policies by looking at the impacts of ex-
tension services on farm productivity. This is only an example of the role of
those policies, but one that, we believe, makes a clear point about what can
be done to help farmers take full advantage of new market opportunities.
To look at extension services and farm productivity, we use data from
the Zambian Post-Harvest Survey. These data are collected annually by
the CSO in Zambia. The survey is a farm survey: farmers are asked about
production, yields, input use, basic household characteristics and demo-
graphics, and the like. One important question for our purposes is whether
the household received extension services. Using this information, we esti-
mate a simple model of cotton productivity. The dependent variable is yield
of cotton per hectare of cultivated land. We control for some important de-
terminants of agricultural production, such as input use, the size of the
farm, the age of the household head, year dummies, and district dummies.
More important, we include a dummy variable for whether the household
received extension services.
Results are reported in table 9.9. As expected, we ﬁnd that cotton yields
respond positively to the use of pesticides. The age and sex of the house-
hold head are not signiﬁcant determinants of agricultural productivity. In-
stead, there is some evidence that smaller farmers are more productive. The
last row of table 9.8 reports the main result that we want to highlight: we
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Table 9.9 Extension services and market agricultural productivity
Yield per hectare Coeﬃcient Standard error
Constant 5.761 0.238
Head male 0.077 0.052
Head age –2.67E–04 0.008
Head age (squared) –3.33E–06 8.05E–05
Small 0.159 0.046
Pesticide 2.250 0.725
Pesticide (squared) –3.160 1.810
Extension services 0.084 0.040
No. of observations 2,187
R2 0.17
Source: Own calculations based on Post-Harvest Surveys.
Note: The regression includes year and district dummies.ﬁnd that households that have received extension services are on average
more productive in market agriculture than households that have not re-
ceived extension services. In fact, receiving agricultural extension services
increases production per hectare by 8.4 percent! This corroborates the idea
that education, information, and marketing services are key factors driv-
ing the best practice supply responses that are needed to secure gains from
international trade.14
9.4 Expenditures
In this section, we investigate some of the consumption eﬀects of price
reforms in Zambia. We begin by describing the structure of expenditure.
Table 9.10reports the average budget shares spent by Zambian households
in diﬀerent goods in 1998. As expected, most of the budget was spent on
food, with a national average share of 67.5 percent. The average was higher
in rural areas (reaching 73.6 percent) and lower in urban areas (56.6 per-
cent). Further, the poor spent a larger share of total expenditure on food
than the nonpoor. At the national level, for instance, 71.7 percent of the to-
tal expenditure of an average poor family was devoted to food, while for
nonpoor households the average was 59.2 percent.
Other goods accounting for a signiﬁcant share of total expenditure were
personal items, housing, transportation, alcohol and tobacco, and educa-
tion. However, these average shares were always below 10 percent. The
usual diﬀerences between urban and rural households, and between the
poor and the nonpoor, were observed. For instance, nonpoor households
tended to spend a larger fraction of expenditure on clothing, personal
items, housing, and transportation. Budget shares on education and health
were not diﬀerent across poor and nonpoor households. Comparing rural
and urban households, we ﬁnd that rural households consumed more food,
and urban households more personal items, housing, transportation, and
education. Shares spent on clothing, health, and alcohol and tobacco were
not very diﬀerent.
There is one fundamental lesson that can be learned from table 9.10. In
Zambia, as in many low-income developing countries, the largest fraction
of household expenditure is spent on food. In consequence, the largest im-
pacts of trade policies and economic reforms on the consumption side will
be caused by changes in the prices of food items. Expenditures on nonfood
items are relatively less important in terms of total expenditure, the welfare
impacts being lower as a result.
Maize is the main food item consumed in Zambia. There are four main
types of maize for consumption: home-produced maize, mugaiwa, roller
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14. For a more detailed analysis of cotton reforms and farm productivity, see Brambilla and
Porto (2005).maize, and breakfast meal. Roller meal and breakfast meal comprise in-
dustrial maize produced by large-scale mills (ﬁg. 9.5). Both are ﬁnely
ground maize, but roller meal is a lower-quality staple. Mugaiwa is the
meal composed of maize grain that is ground by small-scale hammermills.
Sometimes farmers (especially women) take the peel oﬀ the grain before
taking it to the hammermill, leading to a tastier maize meal (ﬁg. 9.6).
Table 9.11 shows that maize consumption indeed accounts for a large
share of expenditure. In 1998, 18.5 percent of the average budget went to
maize outlays at the national level; the corresponding ﬁgures in rural and
urban areas were 21 percent and 14.2 percent. The total expenditure on
maize was relatively balanced between home production, industrial maize,
and mugaiwa. However, it is clear that households in rural areas spent a
larger share on home-produced maize and on mugaiwa than households in
urban areas, which spent more on industrial maize. There were important
provincial diﬀerences in maize shares. In Lusaka, which includes the capi-
tal city, the average household devoted a moderate share to maize, mostly
to industrial varieties. In Luapula and in the Northern Province, the shares
spent on maize were much lower. This is because these regions specialize in
growing cassava rather than maize (and, in Luapula, ﬁshing is a key eco-
nomic activity). In the remaining provinces, maize was the main staple.
Zambia adopted large reforms in the maize sector during the 1990s. Be-
fore 1993, maize marketing was controlled by a maize marketing board,
which set prices for maize grain and maize meal. In particular, breakfast
and roller meals were heavily subsidized. In 1993, the government elimi-
nated all price controls. Given the importance of maize as a food expendi-
ture in Zambia, in what follows we investigate the consumption eﬀects of
the elimination of these large consumption subsidies.
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Table 9.10 Average budget shares (%)
National Rural Urban
Total Poor Nonpoor Total Poor Nonpoor Total Poor Nonpoor
Food 67.5 71.8 59.3 73.6 74.6 70.3 56.6 63.1 51.2
Clothing 5.6 4.8 7.1 5.6 5.2 7.0 5.5 3.6 7.1
Alcohol and tobacco 3.6 2.9 4.9 3.7 3.0 6.0 3.3 2.3 4.1
Personal goods 7.1 6.8 7.6 5.7 6.1 4.5 9.5 9.1 9.9
Housing 4.5 4.2 5.0 2.9 3.0 2.4 7.3 7.7 6.9
Education 2.5 2.6 2.3 1.9 2.1 1.0 3.6 3.9 3.3
Health 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.7
Transport 4.2 3.2 5.9 3.4 3.1 4.3 5.5 3.6 7.1
Remittances 1.3 0.7 2.4 1.0 0.7 1.9 1.9 0.8 2.8
Other 2.4 1.7 3.9 0.9 0.8 1.2 5.1 4.2 5.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The government subsidized maize to consumers by regulating maize
milling and sales. Large-scale mills located in urban centers distributed in-
dustrial maize (breakfast and roller meal) throughout the country and con-
trolled most of the market for maize meal. Small-scale mills (hammermills)
were not allowed to participate in maize marketing. Their function was to
mill own-produced grain for home consumption. Because of the subsidies
to production and industrial maize, it was often cheaper for rural con-
sumers to sell their harvested maize and buy cheap milled maize.
When the marketing board was eliminated, consumer prices for break-
fast and roller maize increased signiﬁcantly. However, the government lib-
eralized the small-scale hammermill sector, allowing mills to enter the mar-
ket. This facilitated the growth of consumption of mugaiwa, a cheaper
form of maize meal, where households would bring grain to the small ham-
mermills for grinding services. The introduction of competition in the
milling industry allowed for the availability of cheaper varieties of meal
maize, and consumers were able to ameliorate the negative impacts of the
elimination of the subsidies.
There is a caveat, though. In times of production shortages, Zambia re-
sorts to imported maize to satisfy food needs. Traditionally, industrial
large-scale mills, as opposed to hammermills, have been able to import
maize or have been granted preferential access to publicly imported grain
(Mwiinga et al. 2002). These constraints on small-scale mills can force
households to consume larger shares of industrial maize and lower shares
of mugaiwa meal, with consequent welfare costs in terms of food security.
We turn next to the investigation of the consumption eﬀects of the re-
forms.15 When the marketing board was eliminated, industrial maize be-
came too expensive for many households.16Not only did the removal of the
subsidy cause higher costs, but the privatized mill industry could have
acted as a monopoly, leading to prices well above marginal costs. With
large average budget shares spent on industrial maize (table 9.10), such
price increases would have signiﬁcant welfare costs for Zambian con-
sumers. For instance, a 100 percent increase in prices with a budget share
of 15 percent among poor households in urban areas would lead to a wel-
fare loss of 15 percent of initial total household expenditure.
To assess the impacts of these reforms on consumers, we would like to es-
timate a system of demand for diﬀerent varieties of maize and use the struc-
tural parameters of demand to carry out an evaluation of the policy
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15. Due to lack of data on input use and transport costs at the household level, we do not
investigate the welfare losses caused by the elimination of support prices to producers, which
is therefore left as a topic for future research.
16. Anecdotal evidence indicates that, in 1991, when the Zambian government ﬁrst at-
tempted to get rid of the marketing board as recommended by the IMF, prices of industrial
maize in urban areas rose by as much as 100 percent. This led to riots and demonstrations that
forced the government to reverse the initial reform.changes. In the case of Zambia, data constraints make it impossible to
carry out a comprehensive examination of the dynamics of maize demand.
It is possible, however, to provide a simpler analysis of the costs of the re-
moval of the subsidies by looking at budget shares. As shown by Deaton
(1989), the eﬀect of a price change can be approximated by budget shares.
For our purposes, there are three relevant budget shares: on maize own
consumption, on breakfast and roller maize (industrial maize), and on mu-
gaiwa maize. We are interested in capturing the extent of substitution re-
sponses in the consumption of diﬀerent types of maize. We can do this by
estimating the average budget share, conditional on the level of household
expenditure. To estimate these averages nonparametrically, we use Fan’s
(1992) locally weighted regressions. We estimate a regression function for
1991 (before the maize reforms) and another for 1998 (after the reform).
Figure 9.7 plots the nonparametric averages by level of per-adult-
equivalent expenditure for rural Zambia in 1991. In the Priority Survey, we
only have information on the share spent on industrial maize. Expenditure
on mugaiwa was negligible, since the milling industry was not liberalized,
and the expenditure on own consumption was not disaggregated into indi-
vidual components. In any case, it is possible to observe that the share of
industrial maize expenditure declines with income (as predicted by Engel’s
law). For the poorest households, the shares reach 14 percent of the bud-
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Fig. 9.7 Share of maize meals in rural Zambia before reforms (1991)
Notes:The graph shows the average budget share spent on industrial maize in rural areas. The
averages are estimated with nonparametric locally weighted regressions (Fan 1992).get. These large fractions are explained in part by the prevalence of the
consumer subsidies.
Figure 9.8 estimates the Fan (1992) regressions after the reforms. The
Living Conditions Monitoring Survey for 1998 includes data on many
types of maize consumption. Thus, we can describe the whole pattern of
household expenditures. The solid line represents the average budget share
spent on industrial maize (breakfast and roller); the broken line, the share
spent on own consumption; and the dotted line, the share spent on mu-
gaiwa. We observe that the most important source of maize meal in 1998 is
mugaiwa, particularly for poorer households (which show shares of over
15 percent of total expenditure). The share of own consumption increases
with income at the bottom of the distribution, and then declines with it as
income grows. In contrast, the share of industrial maize is relatively con-
stant at all income levels.
This analysis clearly shows how rural households have substituted away
from industrial maize and toward mugaiwa maize. Estimates by Mwiinga
et al. (2002) indicate that the price of mugaiwa maize (which includes grain
expenses plus milling services) is only about 60 to 80 percent of the price of
industrial maize. The pattern of substitution reported by Zambian house-
holds thus reveals the beneﬁts brought about by the possibility of having
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Fig. 9.8 Share of maize meals in rural Zambia after reforms (1998)
Notes: The graph shows the average budget shares spent on maize. The solid line represents
the share of industrial maize; the broken line, the share of own consumption; and the dotted
line, the share spent on mugaiwa. The averages are estimated with nonparametric locally
weighted regressions (Fan 1992).access to this cheaper source of maize meal. For this to be possible, liber-
alization of the market was critical. Moreover, it is even possible for con-
sumers to beneﬁt from the overall reforms (elimination of marketing board
and concurrent liberalization of mills) if, due to the deregulation, mugaiwa
prices declined (much) below the price of industrial maize before the re-
form.17
As already mentioned, there are some restrictions on small mills im-
posed by the government. Since Zambia substantially relies on maize for
food security, the country must resort to imports in times of production
shortages. Typically, the government would grant special privileges to
large-scale mills to import maize. They were allowed to import maize, or
they were given preferential access to government-imported maize. This
implies that local maize shortages, like those observed in 2001–2, would be
accompanied by a shortage of mugaiwa. As a result, consumers would be
forced to purchase more expensive industrial maize. The estimated aver-
ages give us a sense of the important welfare eﬀects that this type of regu-
lation can impose on poor rural households.
9.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated some of the impacts of international
trade and economic reforms on rural households in Zambia. This is a low-
income country, with widespread and prevalent poverty at the national and
regional levels. In rural areas, poverty is still higher. In this context, eﬀorts
devoted to ﬁnding ways to alleviate poverty should be welcome. In Zam-
bia, the government and international institutions have long been actively
searching for programs and policies to improve the living standards of the
population. Concretely, a set of reforms was implemented during the
1990s, including liberalization, privatization, and deregulation of market-
ing boards in agriculture. Further, farmers and ﬁrms were encouraged to
look more closely at international markets.
After episodes of economic reform, households are aﬀected both as con-
sumers and as income earners. Consequently, we have looked at these two
aspects of the globalization-poverty link. On the income side, we have es-
timated income gains from market agriculture vis-à-vis subsistence agri-
culture. On the consumption side, we have investigated the eﬀects of the
elimination of the consumer subsidies on maize that were caused by the
elimination of the maize marketing board.
International trade and export growth would bring about an increase in
the demand for traded goods produced by Zambian farmers. These include
cotton, tobacco, hybrid maize, vegetables, and groundnuts. Further, rais-
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17. Unfortunately, there are no data on mugaiwa prices before the reform with which to bet-
ter assess this outcome.ing the demand for rural labor would increase rural wages as well. Our re-
sults indicate that rural Zambians would gain substantially from expand-
ing world markets, particularly in terms of cotton, tobacco, and maize in-
come as well as wage income.
For this to be feasible, Zambia needs to have access to international mar-
kets. On the one hand, this requires the liberalization of world agricultural
markets. But complementary policies would also be essential. On the pro-
duction side, these include extension services (information), infrastructure
(transport), irrigation, access to credit and ﬁnance, education, and health
services.
The elimination of consumer subsidies on the main staple, maize, caused
large welfare losses in rural households. Here, complementary policies
were shown to have important eﬀects as well. On the one hand, the liberal-
ization of the milling industry allowed for the surge and development of the
consumption of mugaiwa maize, a cheaper source of maize meal. This al-
lowed for a strong substitution pattern in consumption whereby house-
holds would consume less of the expensive industrial maize varieties and
more of the cheaper mugaiwa. On the other hand, the restrictions on im-
ports of maize by small mills limited the extent of substitution that was fea-
sible in times of maize production shortages.
We end with our main conclusion. Globalization and domestic reforms
complement each other: the beneﬁts from globalization can be fully ex-
ploited only if complementary measures are simultaneously taken, and the
beneﬁts from domestic reforms may not happen without global markets.
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Comment Matthew J. Slaughter
The conference for the proceedings of this book was held in Massachusetts.
I drove to this conference with my wife and our two boys, and en route we
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School of Business, Dartmouth College, and a research associate of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.stopped at Plymouth Plantation, along the Massachusetts coast. We did
this because our older boy Nicholas (and by osmosis his little brother Ja-
cob) has been studying the Pilgrims in school. The Plantation is a living-
history museum, whose main attraction is a thriving replica of the com-
munity of Jamestown established by the Mayﬂower settlers in the 1620s.
The museum curators assume the roles of real settlers, with astonishing
accuracy in terms of dress, accent, and knowledge of actual events. You
can talk with these settlers as you wander around their dwellings and in-
frastructure. During our visit I learned that the settlers’ economic liveli-
hood consisted of two main activities. One was agriculture, largely for self-
suﬃciency. The other was hunting small game, in particular beaver, whose
pelts were exported back to Europe as a key intermediate input needed to
make what at that time were some of the ﬁnest fur hats in the world. In ex-
change, settlers imported almost all their nonagricultural consumption
goods such as furniture, farm implements, and armaments for self-defense.
I am reporting this not to bore you with my knowledge of ﬁrst-grade
civics (although I can report that Nicholas’s classmates were keen to see
our souvenirs, especially the small amount of plantation dirt and rocks we
were permitted to take). No, this segue is instructive because the economic
ties forged by the Plymouth settlers nearly 400 years ago are precisely the
sort of economic ties that Zambians have been seeking to forge, as ana-
lyzed by this very interesting paper of Balat and Porto. Indeed, for any of
you familiar with Plymouth Plantation, see if you are struck as I was by the
similarity of the plantation grounds to the photographs of rural Zambia
that Balat and Porto included with their paper.
The Jamestown Pilgrims survived those harsh early years largely be-
cause of their global engagement. Their consumption basket was suﬃ-
ciently wide and deep thanks to their ability to become part of a global pro-
duction network, mediated by multinational ﬁrms. These are classic gains
from trade that we all teach and extol: greater production specialization on
the production side according to comparative advantage, combined with
greater consumption possibilities thanks to removing the constraint of
consuming one’s own production. At issue in this paper is whether citizens
of Zambia have been able to reap such gains in recent years.
The authors’ focus on Zambia is well matched to the twin themes of this
conference volume of globalization and poverty. On the latter subject,
Zambia in recent decades has sadly been one of the poorest countries on
the planet. The 2000 per capita GDP of Zambia was US$302. This aston-
ishingly low average was spread across most of the population of 10.7 mil-
lion: as table 9.1 reports, the national poverty rate was 69.6 percent in 1991,
80 percent in 1996, and 71.5 percent in 1998. Today in 2005 there are deep
discussions to reinvigorate eﬀorts to reduce world poverty, and high on
many lists is the policy prescription for “greater global engagement.” This
policy plank is widely acknowledged to be necessary but not suﬃcient,
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other changes works best.
Zambia is thus Exhibit A for the challenges facing the development
community, and the work in this paper is an important contribution to ex-
isting knowledge. The authors bring careful data analysis to bear on two
issues arising from Zambia’s substantial policy liberalizations over the
1990s. One issue is whether individual producers gained from the new pro-
duction opportunities that liberalization introduced to sell output on mar-
kets—including international markets—rather than producing just for
own consumption. The other issue is how consumers were aﬀected by the
removal of price controls on maize, the largest single item in the typical
household consumption basket. As a trade economist, I especially like the
juxtaposition of these issues as they constitute the numerator and denom-
inator of the real-income impacts that freer trade can generate in the
benchmark Heckscher-Ohlin trade models through the celebrated Stolper-
Samuelson mechanism.
For each of the two issues, there is a main ﬁnding. First, by comparing
the income earned by own-production farmers with their observationally
equivalent (as best the data allow such matches to be made) farmers selling
output into markets (and/or working for wage on larger-scale farms), the
authors argue that substantial income gains could have been earned by
Zambian producers who pursued the new market opportunities after lib-
eralization. Second, by examining relative prices across the four diﬀerent
qualities of maize available in Zambia, the authors ﬁnd that substitution
toward relatively cheap varieties could have been an important mechanism
for cushioning the welfare impact of liberalization-induced price increases
in higher-quality varieties. For both these results, the authors stress that
“complementary policies,” above and beyond trade liberalization, could
have been an important factor in facilitating such switches. On the produc-
tion side, such complementary policies probably included capital market
access and extension services on crop quality and husbandry. On the con-
sumption side, they probably included allowing market entry of new maize
producers to meet shifting demand.
I have two general comments on the authors’ careful work, both of
which suggest future research directions. Both comments build on the ital-
icized verb clauses of the previous paragraph, which are ﬂagged on pur-
pose.
The ﬁrst general comment is that we need to know not just whether pro-
ducers and consumers could haveresponded to liberalization policies in the
ways just summarized. We also need to know whether in fact such shifts
have happened in experiences like that of Zambia.
In general equilibrium models of trade, the focus tends not to be on how
exactly national productive resources get reallocated from the autarky pro-
duction point to its free-trade counterpart. That is okay for some ques-
414 Jorge F. Balat and Guido G. Portotions. But in the real world the “how exactly” part is very important. Do
existing ﬁrms continue and just change their product mix? Alternatively, do
existing ﬁrms shut down and new ﬁrms start up in new industries? Are
there important geographic shifts that accompany the industry shifts? On
the consumption side, do families need to travel great distances to ﬁnd new
options? Unfortunately, the data of Balat and Porto are inherently un-
suited to answer these sorts of “how exactly” questions, in large part be-
cause they have repeated cross sections rather than a true panel that tracks
over time the same people and/or ﬁrms. Those interested in this essential
line of research need more evidence on how production and consumption
shifts actually do (and do not) happen.
My second general comment is that we need to know more about the role
of what the authors call “complementary policies.” Yes, there is a wide
range of such policies that could help trigger the gains from trade liberal-
ization; but which ones actually work?
Again, this is clearly a tall order that data limitations prevent the authors
from addressing. They try with their analysis of farming extension ser-
vices, where table 9.9 shows that receiving extension services is correlated
with higher-productivity farms. This is suggestive, at best. Without any in-
formation on how selection into receiving extension services actually oc-
curs, the identifying assumption that it is exogenous to farm performance
cannot really be favored over the completely opposite story that govern-
ments choose to allocate scarce extension-services resources to what ap-
pear to be (arguably unobservably to the econometrician) high-performing
producers.
There is much international research lately, contentious and otherwise,
concluding that freer trade is probably a necessary reform but is unlikely a
suﬃcient reform to trigger economic growth. But this deepens our need for
institutional details like that raised in this study. We need case studies of
what was tried where, and to what degree of success. The analogy of the
practice of medicine comes to mind. Most clinical treatments that we take
as conventional wisdom today gained this status only thanks to long his-
tories of inductive trial and error. For the most vulnerable citizens of the
world, like those of Zambia, more careful research like that in this paper is
needed to make policy less a matter of trial and error.
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